The Signal
Luxquanta and partners demonstrate 8,000-km hybrid quantum-safe network
A five-node demonstration at SC26 linked Chicago, Amsterdam and the Bilbao area using quantum key distribution on short connections and post-quantum cryptography on longer routes. The partners also used one framework to coordinate key systems and protect traffic at optical, network and application layers.

A transatlantic demonstration
A five-node demonstration spanning Chicago, Amsterdam and the Bilbao area combined quantum key distribution (QKD) with post-quantum cryptography (PQC) across about 8,000 km. Luxquanta’s release, dated November 18, 2026, says the network was demonstrated at SC26, the Supercomputing Conference 2026, in Chicago.
The consortium comprises the University of the Basque Country (EHU), Luxquanta, Ciena, GÉANT, Poznań Supercomputing and Networking Center (PCSS), RedIRIS and SURF. Two nodes were placed at Ciena and PCSS booths in Chicago, less than 1 km apart; SURF hosted a node in Amsterdam, while two EHU sites in Bilbao and Zamudio, in Bizkaia, Spain, were joined by a 25 km link.
QKD on shorter links, PQC on longer routes
QKD was used on the two shorter connections: between the Chicago booths and between the EHU sites in Bizkaia. Luxquanta says its Nova lq QKD systems, installed at four nodes, generated encryption keys for those links. The company says its technology can share an optical fiber with classical data; Ciena multiplexers combined the quantum channel, the QKD systems’ service channel and the encrypted data channel on a single fiber pair.
For optical encryption, Ciena’s platform used WL6e at 1.6 Tb/s in Chicago and WL5e at 800 Gb/s on the Bizkaia link, according to Luxquanta. Luxquanta says fiber-based QKD works over limited distances, roughly up to 100 km, so the demonstration used PQC on the longer routes: about 1,200 km from the Bilbao area to Amsterdam and about 7,000 km from Amsterdam to Chicago.
Those long links used ML-KEM to establish keys. The release identifies ML-KEM as a standard published by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology. It describes PQC as software that can run over internet connections, including across distances beyond those used for the QKD links in the demonstration.
One framework coordinates the systems
QuLore, an adaptive security framework developed by EHU’s i2T research group, coordinated the demonstration. Luxquanta says QuLore selected QKD or PQC for each connection based on what was available at the endpoints and across the network, and coordinated the systems managing the keys.
Where endpoints were not directly connected by QKD, including Chicago and Bilbao, keys were relayed through intermediate sites, including SURF’s Amsterdam node. Key-management systems from Luxquanta, EHU and SURF worked together through standard interfaces; SURF’s open-source eduKMS ran in Amsterdam. A monitoring interface displayed key exchanges as they occurred.
Three layers of protection
The demonstration encrypted data at the optical, network and application layers. Ciena’s systems encrypted data in the fiber, while IPsec tunnels protected traffic between sites on the long links. At the application layer, a modified open-source video-call application encrypted audio and video end to end, using a separate key for each direction of each stream.
Luxquanta says the framework and interoperability could support mixed networks that cannot install QKD hardware at every site, with the system selecting between QKD and PQC according to what is available between endpoints. The release also describes satellite-based QKD as a possible future replacement for PQC on cross-continental links, once that becomes possible; it was not part of the demonstration described.