The Signal
ETH Zurich paper says PQC could reshape internet routing security
A HotNets 2026 paper argues that post-quantum cryptography could require changes to internet-routing security, not just replacement signatures. Its analysis finds that several post-quantum signature schemes would push modeled BGPsec messages beyond current size limits.

Beyond swapping signatures
Post-quantum cryptography could require changes to internet-routing security, not just replacement cryptographic algorithms, ETH Zurich researchers argue in a paper appearing at the ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks (HotNets 2026). The paper says larger post-quantum signatures could strain routing protocols and proposes exploring designs that support multiple algorithms or use other cryptographic tools.
The paper, by Marco Pioppini, Yi-Min Lin, Jonghoon Kwon and Adrian Perrig, focuses on inter-domain routing: how autonomous systems exchange information about which internet addresses they can reach. That system relies on the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to check information carried by the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). The RPKI uses digital signatures, which the authors say would become untrustworthy if a sufficiently capable quantum computer could forge them.
Current proposals concentrate on moving the RPKI to post-quantum cryptography. One migration approach would require operators to maintain two synchronized RPKI trees, one using the old algorithm and another the new one, until participants complete the change. The paper notes that this migration method has not been tested in practice and that its feasibility has been questioned.
Large signatures, larger messages
The authors argue that a one-time migration may not be enough: a weakness found in a post-quantum algorithm could prompt another change, while repeated ecosystem-wide migrations would demand substantial coordination. They also examine BGPsec, a routing-security mechanism in which routers verify and sign the network path included in announcements. Unlike RPKI route-origin checks, BGPsec puts signatures directly into BGP messages and requires routers to perform cryptographic operations.
The paper models BGPsec message sizes across 18.16 million autonomous-system paths from a Route Views 2 snapshot dated July 13, 2026. In that analysis, Falcon-512 signatures push messages covering more than five hops—5.3% of the paths—past BGP’s default 4 KiB size limit. ML-DSA-44 pushes essentially every modeled message past 4 KiB, although they remain within the 64 KiB extended-message ceiling.
With SLH-DSA-128f, the paper estimates that 60% of messages would exceed even the extended limit. Those estimates use post-quantum signatures rather than hybrid signatures; the paper says combining classical and post-quantum signatures would make messages larger still. BGPsec is not currently deployed, but the researchers say its message sizes and the need to update participating routers make a future migration difficult.
Options for a more flexible system
One proposed research direction is to use different signature algorithms for different RPKI objects, reflecting their differing security needs and lifetimes. The authors estimate that using SLH-DSA for the five root certificate authorities would add 43 KiB to the current RPKI database and 1 millisecond of verification overhead. For a full SLH-DSA hierarchy, their estimates show roughly 560 MiB more repository data and about five seconds of verification time compared with the current RSA-2048 deployment without batching.
The paper also considers signing one object with multiple algorithms, allowing relying parties to choose which signatures to trust. That could reduce the need for every network to agree on a single algorithm, but different validation policies could lead networks to accept or reject the same object differently. Carrying and verifying multiple signatures would also add resource costs.
Research questions remain
Another direction is to investigate symmetric cryptographic tools, such as message authentication codes or hash functions, where they could replace signatures. The authors identify BGPsec’s hop-by-hop authentication as one possible area to study, while noting that some symmetric approaches work only for live verifiers with loosely synchronized clocks.
The RPKI estimates depend on the system’s current, relatively flat hierarchy; the paper says the effects of more delegated repositories remain future work. Its proposals are research directions, not deployed changes, and the paper says further work is needed on interoperability, routing behavior and scalability.